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Migration Policy Series 37 Limpopo has a slightly greater proportion of recent arrivals than Cape Town. In Limpopo, there is a clear time lag between year of migration to South Africa and year of arrival in the province. As many as 64% of the refugee entrepreneurs in Limpopo had lived in another South African town or city first (compared to only 27% in Cape Town).
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of violence against non-South African informal businesses. Experience of violent crime and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for moving to Limpopo, which appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environment than South Africa's large cities. But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimization, it does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told stories of being robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police misconduct emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo.
Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart, the Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range of economic activities. The vast majority in both locations are in the retail sector (75-79%),
followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4%-8%). The kinds of goods being sold and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, confectionary, soft drinks, and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items sold are cigarettes, clothing/footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and beverages.
Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they are selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of either group, South Africans dominate the sale of fresh and cooked food and refugees are more likely to be selling footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products.
With regard to the business operations of refugees in the two locations, the main findings were as follows:
Around 20% of both groups used loans from relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives and 12% gifts from relatives. Very few were able to access funding from banks, NGOs refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa or the UNHCR. The main difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Limpopo were able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses.
keeping business records, negotiating prices with suppliers, allowing customers to buy goods on credit, and competitive prices. Refugees consult other entrepreneurs, suppliers and the media for information about the price of goods. There was very little difference in the frequency of use of business strategies by the two groups of refugees. Living in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiating with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs. Almost a third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies, while most
Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city.
than those in Cape Town, their enterprises are not as profitable. The Limpopo refugees earned less on average than their Cape Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 versus ZAR11,315
per month.
ness value with significant upward movement out of the lowest value category of less than ZAR5,000. The proportion of businesses in the ZAR50,000-plus value category increased from 27% to 47% in Cape Town and in Limpopo from 15% to 42%, suggesting that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better in Limpopo than in Cape Town.
The establishment and growth of refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for a variety of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers including wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers. Around two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase supplies from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage. Refugees in Cape Town are also more likely to patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Limpopo are more likely to patronize small shops. The average monthly spend at wholesalers was very similar in both Cape Town and Limpopo (ZAR35,000).
The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to migration policy series no. 76
pay income tax, they pay VAT on most goods purchased from formal sector suppliers and do not claim rebates.
Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners.
While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner, this was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%). The average monthly rentals were very similar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in Limpopo.
Fourth, the municipal government has a direct financial interest in its dealings with refugees. Particularly in Cape Town, refugees pay into municipal coffers through rent for business sites. This amounted to 22% of the refugee entrepreneurs compared with only 4% in Limpopo. These rents were higher in Cape Town, an average of ZAR879 per month compared to only ZAR311 per month in Limpopo. Also, as many as 28% of Limpopo-based refugees (and 21% of those in Cape Town) pay an annual licence fee to the municipality.
The cost of a business licence is much higher in Cape Town at ZAR1,959 per year compared to ZAR752 per year in Limpopo.
Fifth, refugee businesses in the informal economy create jobs. Around half (52%) of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%) of the Limpopo entrepreneurs employ people in their businesses. The Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were equally likely to employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created).
While the Limpopo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total employees), both groups preferred to hire South African women than men (with 65-70% of South African employees in both sites being female).
Finally, it is clear from the accounts of refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo that one of the primary beneficiaries of their activities in the informal economy is the South
African consumer who can access goods and services much more cheaply than from formal sector suppliers. These include necessities such as cheaper food for the food insecure, luxuries such as household and personal products, and services such as panel-beating.
INTRODUCTION
More than 60% of the world's refugees now live in urban areas, according to the UNHCR.
The social and economic impacts of refugee movements are therefore increasingly being felt in the towns and cities of host nations. In general, the presence of refugees among urban populations is more likely to be assessed in terms of perceived burdens than benefits. Some researchers have adopted the notion of "refugee economies" to highlight the strong involvement of refugees in the many overlapping processes of production, consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and development of financial and capital markets in host countries and beyond. 3 However, it would be a mistake to imagine that there are discrete spatially and economically isolated "refugee economies" in the urban environment. Refugees may dominate particular economic and geographical niches in the urban economy but they continuously interact with and contribute to that economy in ways that are poorly understood. As refugees increasingly become the norm in the urbanizing Global South, more research on the specifically urban economic impacts of protracted refugee situations is therefore urgently needed. 4 This report aims to contribute to recent literature that takes "refugee livelihoods" as its point of departure.
5
A livelihoods perspective underscores the need to adopt a rightsbased approach to the economic activities of forced migrants; to identify their resources, assets and skills; and to understand how they respond to their situation and secure their livelihood needs. This perspective represents a move away from welfare-centred models of engagement focused on meeting basic needs towards a capability approach, which emphasizes refugees' agency, right to choose, and ability to control their own environments. 6 Identifying the economic advantages and benefits associated with the presence of refugees is a key precondition for making governments and local elites more responsive to refugee needs and removing the barriers they face. 7 This objective coheres with the UNHCR's Global Strategy for Livelihoods, which underscores the need to enhance the economic capabilities of refugee populations and build on their own resilience. 8 The sizable case-study literature on refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa is dominated by an overwhelming sense of the problems they face and their marginalized existence, reinforcing an image of victimhood, exploitation and vulnerability. 9 In recent years, a more troubling image has emerged of refugees as unfair and underhand competi- Post-apartheid South Africa has relied on a "self-settlement" approach to refugees.
11
The country imposes no restrictions on freedom of movement and the geographical locations where refugees can reside. They are not confined to refugee camps or physically separated from citizens, which means they have direct interaction with South Africans with the potential for both conflict and integration into local communities. However, the South
African self-settlement model does emphasize self-sufficiency on the part of refugees in the process of resettlement, with little assistance from state authorities. 12 Existing studies suggest that many urban refugees are unable, for various reasons, to access formal employment in the cities and turn to the informal economy for their livelihoods. 13 Employment or self-employment in the informal economy becomes a desirable option, if not a necessity.
Because urban informality is generally invisible to policy-makers, scorned by politicians, and seen as a site of desperation rather than opportunity, its economic significance is often minimized.
14
The primary aim of this report is to examine what we call "refugee entrepreneurial economies" in urban South Africa. The report builds on case-study evidence on the activities of refugees in the South African informal economy. 15 Within the informal sector, refugee enclaves have often been viewed as stagnant pools of desperation, providing narrow opportunities and limited scope for advancement. But this, too, is a misleading characterization. It is important to recognize the dynamism and growing complexity of South African refugee economies and to re-shape our ideas about their positive economic impacts. 16 The important question is whether all forms of refugee activity in the informal sector are associated with economic precariousness and social marginality, or whether possibilities for real economic advancement exist. 17 In this report, we seek to broaden the image of refugees and their economic impacts beyond a narrow focus on their marginal status and vulnerability. We view them as dynamic agents with skills and capabilities who can play an integral role in transforming local settings and contributing to economic development. This is not to undervalue the divergent ways through which refugees earn a living in South Africa, nor to gloss over their struggles and the pervasive discrimination, hostility and xenophobic violence they regularly encounter, nor to exaggerate the significance of refugee entrepreneurship. However, there is a need to recalibrate the narrow, partial and negative lens through which their economic potential is evaluated by politicians and policy-makers. Here, we also address the question of whether geographical location makes a difference to the nature of refugee entrepreneurial economies by contrasting refugee enterprise in a major South African city (Cape Town)
with that in several smaller towns in a different part of the country (Limpopo province).
Our aim is to ascertain whether geography matters in framing the activities, challenges and impacts of refugee entrepreneurial economies.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Most refugees are initially drawn to the major South African cities of Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. In this study of refugee entrepreneurship, the city of Cape Town was chosen as one of two study sites because there is a significant concentration of refugees and a contextual literature on refugee entrepreneurship in the city. 18 In recent years, refugee entrepreneurs have also been establishing businesses in smaller urban areas around the country. A police campaign called Operation Hardstick in Limpopo province in 2012 forcibly closed as many as 600 small businesses run by migrants and refugees, suggesting that this province had become a significant operating location for small-town entrepreneurs. In contrast to Cape Town, however, very little research exists on refugee livelihoods and entrepreneurship in Limpopo, which was chosen as the second site for this study.
19
The study focused only on informal sector business owners who hold refugee (Section 24) permits under the Refugees Act. Holders of asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits
were not included as many of these migrants are unlikely to be refugees, as conventionally defined. The South African government claims that 90% of asylum-seeker permit holders are "economic migrants" and not genuine refugees as defined by the Refugee Conventions.
While this figure has been disputed by researchers, it is not possible to predict whether migration policy series no. 76
any particular asylum-seeker permit holder will make the transition to full refugee status.
Indeed, the majority probably will not. 20 In 2015, SAMP conducted surveys of migrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town and Johannesburg and found that in Cape Town, one third of the respondents were refugees. 21 All potential respondents were asked if they had a Section 24 permit as a filtering question. They were not asked to show their permits to verify their claim as this would have been intrusive and redolent of police (mis)conduct. It is therefore possible that some of the respondents did not have Section 24 permits (which could explain why a small number were from countries with a limited or non-existent official record of successful refugee applications in South Africa). However, it is also possible to buy a false Section 24 permit through various back channels.
The number and geographical location of refugee enterprises in South Africa is unknown, which means that there is no comprehensive population from which to draw a sample. The study therefore relied on maximum variation sampling (MVS) using the methodology suggested by a recent study of the informal economy in Bangalore. 22 The basic principle is that by randomly sampling within a selection of diverse and contrasting areas of the city, researchers can arrive at a sample that is very close to being representative.
In Cape Town, the areas of the city in which the informal economy is known to operate were first identified. This allowed for the exclusion of significant areas of the city from the study, particularly high-income residential areas. Second, five different types of area were identified -commercial, formal residential, informal residential, mixed formal and informal residential, and industrial. Within each of these types, contrasting and geographically separated areas were chosen. There were two commercial areas (the CBD and Bellville), two industrial areas (Maitland and Parow), three formal residential areas (Observatory, Delft and Nyanga), three informal settlements (Khayelitsha, Imizamo Yethu and Masiphumelele) and two mixed formal and informal residential areas (Philippi and Dunoon).
The number of refugee business owners interviewed in each suburb is listed in Table   1 . An attempt was made to interview similar numbers in each area. However, this was not always possible as it soon became evident that refugee entrepreneurs tend to cluster in certain areas of the city. In Nyanga, Dunoon and Masiphumelele, for example, where there is a great deal of hostility towards foreign nationals, it was difficult to find refugees conducting businesses. In contrast, residential areas such as Parow, Maitland, Cape Town CBD, Bellville and Observatory are considered relatively safe areas to conduct business. Interviews in one pre-selected area could not be carried out because of the intervention of the local taxi association which demanded financial recompense in exchange for access to the area.
It transpired that the association was running a protection racket, obliging refugees to pay daily "fees" for operating in the area. The association later changed its position on access but by then another area had been selected and the interviews completed. Total 504
In Limpopo, the majority of migrant entrepreneurs live in urban centres. Since many of these centres are relatively small, the primary criterion for the application of MVS in
Limpopo was variable urban size. The selected towns are scattered around the province and include Polokwane (population of 130,000), Thohoyandou (70,000), Musina (43,000), Louis Trichardt (25,000), Tzaneen (14,500) and Burgersfort (6,000). The number of refugee business owners interviewed in each town is listed in Table 2 . In Musina, close to the Zimbabwean border, the informal trade is dominated by refugees from countries including Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, who deal in retail targeted at the Zimbabwean market. The same is true of Burgersfort, where most local people prefer to lease their business premises to migrants and refugees rather than operate businesses themselves. In Tzaneen and Polokwane, however, informal businesses operated by South Africans tend to dominate. In Tzaneen, in particular, there were few refugee entrepreneurs operating and those who were tended to congregate in the CBD. 
Total surveyed 504
Sampling was conducted in each site using the mapped grid-pattern exhibited by streets.
Streets were sampled one after another in successive fashion moving from west to east.
After identifying the first five enterprises on a street, and randomly selecting the first of the five for the sample, every third refugee-owned enterprise was selected for interview. Where business owners were not available, fieldworkers made three call backs to the enterprise, after which a substitution was made. In the two study areas combined, a total of 1,008 refugee entrepreneurs were interviewed. The survey was administered using tablet technology and collected information on a wide variety of issues pertaining to business set-up, activities, operation, profitability, challenges, and economic impacts. The enterprise survey was complemented with 50 in-depth interviews with business owners in each research location and three focus groups with refugees from the same country in each location.
REFUGEE PROFILE
This section of the report compares refugee business owners in Cape Town and smalltown Limpopo to ascertain if there are any significant differences in their respective sociodemographic and migration profiles. First, male refugee entrepreneurs clearly dominate in both areas, with only 20-25% of business owners being women (Table 3) . This is generally consistent with the predominantly male character of refugee migration to South Africa. The vast majority of sampled refugee business owners (over 90% in both research locations) arrived in South Africa after 2000 ( Figure 1 ). (Table 4) . In other words, Cape Town was the first destination for nearly three-quarters of the refugee entrepreneurs in that sample while Limpopo was the first destination for only 13% of the entrepreneurs sampled there. In the Limpopo sample, previous places of residence were dominated by the large cities, especially Johannesburg (29%) and Pretoria (13%), but also Durban (5%) and even Cape Town (5%), which is nearly 2,000 km away. The movement of refugees from Limpopo to Cape Town was much more limited. As many as 17% of the Limpopo refugees had lived in another town in the province, suggesting the existence of some intra-provincial mobility. This kind of movement was virtually absent in the case of Cape Town and the Western Cape province. In the Cape Town sample, the majority of the 28% who had lived in another urban area came from Johannesburg, with much smaller numbers from cities such as Pretoria and Durban. The impact of xenophobic violence is exacerbated by poor police response and follow-up.
Refugees have little faith in police protection or judicial reparation. 30 According to one refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa study, the perceived failure of the authorities to control migration has exacerbated violent attacks on migrants and refugees. 31 Some studies have suggested that attacks on refugee-owned businesses are instigated or orchestrated by South African competitors, including various shadowy informal business associations.
32
This phenomenon -dubbed "violent entrepreneurship" -involves the use of intimidatory violence as a business strategy to drive non-South African competitors out of an area.
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The most frequent and intense xenophobic attacks and instances of violent entrepreneurship have occurred in low-income neighbourhoods in large cities. The in-depth interviews with Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs confirmed that xenophobic violence was a major factor in relocation from cities of first refuge. One Somali refugee recounted how he had arrived in Johannesburg after a long and difficult journey through several countries; experiences consistent with that of other Somali refugees. 34 In Johannesburg, he lived with his brother and neighbours from the same village in Somalia. His brother operated a business buying goods in the CBD and selling them at his shop in Soweto. He worked for his brother for a while but found the experience unnerving: "I did not want to operate in Soweto. The people there were nice but there were others who were just rough. I had seen two people being killed in broad daylight and they were all foreigners and their shops were robbed. So I wanted to go somewhere else. " With his brother's assistance he bought a small spaza (informal shop) in Orange Farm south of Johannesburg and ran it for a year:
Orange Farm was a good area for business but it was not safe. As a foreigner you are always conscious of your security and you can feel that this place is not good. It is far from the Johannesburg CBD and there are few police there. So even when there are robberies, the police come very late and sometimes they do not come at all. I was robbed seven times in the period that I stayed in Orange
Farm. Most of the time the robbers would come when it is at night and you are still operating. They pounce on you with sticks, spanners or iron bars and they hit you hard. So I was almost killed twice and I thought this is enough. Let me leave this place. Then I left and came here.
35
Experience of violent crime and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for moving to Limpopo. Interviewees moved to escape being injured or murdered rather than specifically to set up a new business. One Eritrean refugee, for example, had his spaza looted and burnt to the ground: "I came here because I was running for my life. I was not thinking of doing business, but of surviving. I was almost killed that night. "
Some have said that South African business owners are just as vulnerable to violent attacks and crime as their refugee counterparts and suggest that xenophobia is therefore not a factor. 37 However, the interviewees in Limpopo clearly saw the violence in Johannesburg and other centres as motivated by xenophobia. As the former Orange Farm business owner noted: "There were many spaza shops around me, but they kept stealing from me. Is that not xenophobia? Why not steal from the locals? The customers sometimes harass you because you are a foreigner. They take your goods and are a problem in paying. So, yes, I
have been affected a lot by xenophobia. "
Limpopo province appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environment than South Africa's large cities. As many as 45% of sampled Cape Town refugees said that xenophobia had affected their business operations to some extent (20%) or a great deal (25%). The equivalent figures in Limpopo were 31% in total (19% to some extent and 12% not at all). Refugees in Cape Town appear to be more vulnerable to theft and physical attack from South African citizens. In the sample, 57% of refugees in Cape Town reported often or sometimes having goods and stock stolen compared to 39% in Limpopo. Similarly, 54% in Cape Town often or sometimes had money stolen compared to 32% in Limpopo.
But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimization, it certainly does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told stories of being robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police disregard for the rights of refugees and migrants is a significant problem in Cape Town and other large cities. 38 However, police misconduct emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo. This survey found that police harassment, demands for bribes, confiscation of goods, and physical violence were all more common in Limpopo than Cape Town (Table 5 ). 
BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS AND STRATEGIES
Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart, the sampled Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range of economic activities. The vast majority of the sample in both locations are in the retail sector (75-79%), followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4-8%) ( Table 6 ). The kinds of goods being sold and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, confectionary, soft drinks, and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items sold are cigarettes, clothing/footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and beverages (Table 7) . Comparing the two, the main difference lies in the greater numbers of refugees selling confectionary, toiletries and cosmetics, and household products in Limpopo. Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they are selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of either group, it is clear from comparison with a control group of 1,000 South Africans in Limpopo and Cape Town that different market niches are occupied. This is particularly evident in the sale of fresh and cooked food (where South Africans are clearly in the majority in both locations) and footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products (where refugees predominate) ( Table 7) . With regard to services, the main difference is in hair braiding and hair salons where there are more refugees than South Africans involved in both Limpopo and Cape Town. The primary sources of business start-up capital in both areas were very similar, suggesting that being in a large city does not provide additional financing opportunities (Table   8 ). Approximately 85% of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo used their personal savings to start their business. Around 20% of both groups used loans from relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives and 12% gifts from relatives. A small number in both areas used remittances from outside the country to establish their businesses. Only a handful of refugees in both areas were able to access funding from banks, NGOs or the UNHCR. The only difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Limpopo were able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses. Despite the similarities in sources of start-up capital, the amounts needed to establish a business did differ. In Limpopo, the sampled refugee entrepreneurs seemed to be able to start a business with less capital. Thirty-four percent had less than ZAR5,000 compared to 21% of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and 63% had less than ZAR10,000 compared to 52% of the Cape Town entrepreneurs. At the other end of the scale, 27% of the sampled Cape Town refugees had more than ZAR50,000 in start-up capital compared to only 15% of those in Limpopo. Despite their lack of prior business experience, refugees in South Africa have developed strategies to maximize their returns. Table 9 Living in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiating with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs, however. Almost one-third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies, while most Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city. This probably affords the latter greater opportunity for bulk buying, negotiation with suppliers and informationsharing. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMIES
In this study, we use two measures of business success: (a) net monthly profit and (b) the difference between the current value of the enterprise and the initial capital outlay. With regard to the first indicator, net profit, it is clear that although refugees in Limpopo are able to start a business with a smaller capital outlay than those in Cape Town, their enterprises are not as profitable. The sampled Limpopo refugees earned less on average than their Cape
Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 per month compared to ZAR11,315 in Cape Town (Table   10 ). Only one-third of the sampled Cape Town entrepreneurs made less than ZAR5,000
per month compared to 58% of those in Limpopo. Or again, 70% of the Limpopo entrepreneurs make less than ZAR7,500 per month compared to only 49% of those in Cape Town. As regards the second indicator of business success -the difference between the amount of start-up capital and the current value of the enterprise -in both Cape Town and Limpopo there are clear indications of increased value. For example, 21% of the sampled entrepreneurs in Cape Town started with less than ZAR5,000 but only 3% of the businesses were currently valued at less than ZAR5,000 (Table 11 ). In Limpopo, the equivalent figures were 34% (start-up) and 14% (current value). In both locations, therefore, there was significant upward movement out of the lowest value category. A similar pattern can be observed with businesses that started with less than ZAR20,000. In Cape Town, 51% fell into this start-up category but only 26% of businesses fell into this value category. The proportion of sampled business in the ZAR50,000-plus category increased from 27% to 47% and in Limpopo from 15% to 42%. This suggests that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better in Limpopo than they are in Cape Town.
The establishment and growth of sampled refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for a variety of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers including wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers.
Around two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase supplies from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage (Table   12 ). Other beneficiaries vary in relative importance, reflecting the difference between operating in a large city and a small town. For example, refugees in Cape Town are more likely to patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Limpopo are more likely to patronize small shops. The fact that more Cape Town refugees purchase directly from farms is primarily a reflection of the existence of a market gardening area (the Philippi Horticultural Area) within the city limits.
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The average monthly spend at wholesalers was very similar in both Cape Town and Limpopo. Otherwise, the amounts spent varied considerably but, in general, the more important the source, the greater the amount spent. Other sources
The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to pay income tax, they do pay value-added tax (VAT) on most goods purchased from formal sector suppliers. One Ethiopian refugee in a Limpopo focus group observed that they not only paid VAT on goods but were unable to claim rebates:
There are many things we do to help the economy. We operate our businesses and we buy our stock from the wholesalers. We pay VAT there so our money is going into the economy. We pay a lot of money that way. Some of our people go to buy goods that are worth ZAR200,000 or even more. Some buy every week and some buy every day. So imagine if you are paying ZAR200,000 for goods and VAT is 14% so that is more than ZAR25,000 I am paying to the government. Even after paying this large amount of VAT we suffer because we cannot claim some of it because we do not have the documents. We are not registered. If we were registered, at the end of the year we would claim some of the VAT like South Africans do. We are actually paying more and contributing more through VAT than most South African small businesses.
40
Another participant claimed that business registration was impossible because "government does not want to register us. " 41 Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners:
South Africans are surviving on us because we pay them money to rent their shops. I pay ZAR4,000 per month to my landlord to use the shop. That is a lot of money. How many local people can afford to pay that money? Locals do not pay that kind of money when they rent. They will pay ZAR1,000 or ZAR1,500
only, not ZAR4,000. We pay because we have no choice, we want to do business and survive.
While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner, this was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%) (Table 13 ). However, the average monthly rentals paid to landlords were very similar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in Limpopo. Renting also provides refugees with a modicum of protection. As one noted: "If your landlord is respected or feared, then you are okay because the thugs will not come and break in. " 42 The Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs were more likely to own their business premises, although the numbers were small (7.4% compared to 2.2% in Limpopo). Fifth, there is a growing consensus in the research literature that migrant businesses in the informal economy create jobs for South Africans, and that this needs to be acknowledged by government. As one refugee observed: "The government does not want to accept that we are contributing. When they talk about us they make it look like we are only taking, taking and taking from the South Africans. " 43 Another pointed out the mutual benefits of employing South Africans:
We employ a lot of South Africans. If your business starts to grow, you employ, not only our people from Ethiopia, but also locals. They help with customers and other things. They speak the language and understand quickly what the customer wants. Even though I understand the language, there are words that I do not know and so it is better when you employ a South African, they will talk and agree and I will communicate with my employee. The locals need work and we also need workers, so it is a mutual benefit.
44
Some refugees also find that employing South Africans is a form of security against theft, although it can be a double-edged sword:
It is good security because they will know the local thugs and thieves and so they may tell them to leave you alone. If you have a bad employee, they may connive with the thieves and steal from you, so it is both ways. Sometimes we employ locals that we know, when we know their parents and we talk to them so that they do not steal and run away. It is better to employ someone from around the area, someone in the community.
45
Around half (52%) of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%) of the Limpopo entrepreneurs employ people in their businesses (Table 14) . In terms of the profile of employees, the Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were equally likely to employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created). While the Limpopo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total employees), both groups preferred to hire South African women over men (with 65-70% of South African employees in both sites being female). What this suggests is that, in both large cities and small urban areas, refugee entrepreneurs may be providing jobs for more South African women than men and thereby contributing to lowering the female unemployment rate. In a focus group, they discussed at length how and why they had established the business, their business challenges and the nature of the service they offer to South Africans:
We are very good at this business. There are many people who come here because they cannot afford to repair their cars in these expensive garages, so we are offering them services otherwise they would not be driving their cars. That is a good service we are offering. Some of the customers actually go to the garages first and the charges there will make them come to us.
46
These refugees also argued, in a prescient manner, that their activities saved the South African government and the UNHCR from having to support them. As one commented:
"In Europe the governments look after the refugees and every month they get paid like they are working. But here we are working for ourselves and are saving the government a lot of money. "
47
CONCLUSION
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on urban refugee livelihoods in the global South and, in particular, to a small but growing body of work on urban refugee entrepreneurship in cities of refuge. 48 The concept of "refugee economies" is a valuable starting point for restoring agency, self-reliance and innovation to populations all too often represented as passive victims. One of the defining characteristics of many large cities in the rapidly urbanizing South is the high degree of informality of shelter, services and economic livelihoods. As one study argues, this involves "highly mobile and provisional possibilities for how people live and make things, how they use the urban environment and collaborate with one another. " 12 Polzer Ngwato, "Policy Shifts in the South African Asylum System. "
